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Abstract 
This research is to investigate different aspects 
of personality Characteristics of financial and exec-
utive directors and their impacts on accounting in-
formation.  This research is organized around three 
themes including examining the effect  of financial 
and executive director’s replacement on quality of 
financial reporting, the effect of managements’ too 
much self-confidence on the output of financial re-
porting, finally the effect of financial and execu-
tive directors’ sex on the output of financial report-
ing. Through considering objective samples, this 
research tries to study the importance of person-
ality characteristics of financial and executive di-
rectors as an important factor on outputs of finan-
cial reporting. This study also attempts to present 
a new insight into improving the quality of corpo-
rating governance and financial reporting. Final-
ly, it shows that without considering the personality 
characteristics of financial and executive directors, 
the structure of corporating governance in each 
firm cannot maximize the stockholders wealth.
Keywords: personality characteristics, corpo-
rating governance, sex, quality of financial report-
ing, financial and executive directors 
Introduction 
Identifying the personality characteristics of 
executive directors is one of the important issues. 
According to academicians, chief executive direc-
tors in each organization aresignificant and have an 
effective role in determining major goals and how 
to deal with quick technological advances andcon-
textual changes (Hillery & Hsu, 2011). Incontrast, 
some scholars believe that context is effective on the 
performance of executive directors and, in turn their 
abilities for influencing organization performance 
are restricted. As an example of organizational cul-
ture, the fixed kind of  assets and industry influ-
ence abilities of executive directors in dealing with 
events which organization encounter to (Shawver, 
Bancroft, & Sennetti, 2006). The results of recen-
tresearches reveal that the effectiveness of executive 
directors on performance of firms is less than the 
effectiveness of contextual factors and competitors. 
For example, Libersone et al. (1972) showed that the 
effectiveness of executive directors on performance 
of the firm is only (6.5%- 14.5%), which is relatively 
less than contextual factorsof competitors (Hennes 
et al., 2008). 
Vaserman et al. (2010) argue that there is sig-
nificant difference between the effectiveness of ex-
ecutive directors and the effectiveness of contextu-
al factors and competitors on performance of firms 
(Shawver, Bancroft, & Sennetti, 2006). However, 
Mackey (2008) found strong evidence in favor of the 
effectiveness of executive directors on the perfor-
mance of the firm. He consideredthe performance 
of the firm as a criterion for measuring the perfor-
mance of directors. The results also showed that ex-
ecutive directors influence the output of accounting 
information (Hillery & Hsu, 2011).
Methodology
Executive directors are selected to maximize the 
expected value of stockholders (Armstrong et al., 
2010).  Information presented in financial statements 
allows the external beneficiaries to study the degree 
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of effectiveness of executive directors on perfor-
mance of firms. So providing the informational re-
quirements of external beneficiaries is a suitable in-
centive to do the operation and reporting correctly. 
The role of executive directors in identifying and re-
porting accounting numbers and income is unde-
niable. Helli (1985) argues that the results of much 
studies show that income is manipulated by exec-
utive directors (Collins et al., 2009), (Habib et al., 
2012). According to the obtained results, executive 
directors put pressure  on financial directors into 
manipulating the income to present a better image 
of the performance of the firms, when it is neces-
sary (Hermalin et al., 2003). This research is to in-
vestigate the effect of personality characteristics of 
executive and financial directors on the quality of 
financial reporting. 
The firms that manipulate the income to present 
a better image of the performance of the firm gen-
erally have serious problems and even go bankrupt 
(Malmendier & Tate, 2009).  Problems arising from 
income manipulation could change the executive di-
rectors.Executive directors are responsible for the ac-
curacy of the financial statements as well as for any 
mistakes or fraud in financial statements.  Therefore, 
one of the duties of executive directors is to manage 
and control the performance of the personnel. In this 
section, prior research about effective management 
of human resources reviewed to help improve the 
performance of directors who present financial state-
ments with low quality. Although these studies are 
favorablefor the market, their effectiveness is influ-
enced by the personality characteristics of executive 
directors (Hambrick et al., 2008).
Results of much researches indicate that per-
sonality characteristics of executive directors such 
as too much self-confidence, optimistic predic-
tions ,profitability at any cost, and cooperating in 
fraudulent actions have a significant role in mak-
ing financial policies like financing, corporating 
governance, and divisions (Goel & Thakor, 2008). 
According to the results of many researches, too 
much self-confidence could be a negative point for 
directors but it also reflects risk-taking of execu-
tive directors to be more profitable. Theeffect of too 
much self-confidence highlights the importance 
of personality characteristics in making corporate 
governance rules.
Sex is effective on  ethical work s of executive 
directors. Some researches indicate that men and 
women have unique interests and they have differ-
ent tendencies in doing unethical behaviors in busi-
ness (Betz,1998).Men are interested in profitability 
and they are generally successful in achieving that 
goal. They also like to use a unique leadership style 
in achieving competitive advantage.However, wom-
en are more sensitive to establishing communica-
tions and helping others and they are less likely to 
do un ethical actions (Huang et al., 2011). There-
fore, sex of executive and financial directors is ef-
fective on their reporting. 
This research attempts to enrich the quality of 
financial reporting through analyzing the previous 
researches. For example, the study of Dechau et al 
(2010) about the effect of firms on quality of the in-
come was used (Collins et al, 2009). Although this 
research is about the quality of financial reporting, 
it tries to pay attention to personality characteristics 
of executive and financial directors, (i.e. too much 
self-confidence and gender of directors). So far, a 
comprehensive research has not yet done about this 
issue. The research ofArmstrong et al. (2010) is one 
of the researches that discusses about lack of trans-
parency of information asymmetries among direc-
tors, owners, andits destructive influence on the 
structure of governance corporating (Armstrong, 
Guay & Weber, 2010).
This research also gives reasons that informa-
tion asymmetries among directors and owners could 
be because of the personality characteristics of ex-
ecutive directors such as orientation, personal ten-
dencies and sex. These issues were not considered 
in Armstrong et al. (2010). Therefore, this research 
can provide a new insight into the role of executive 
directors among external and internal beneficiaries. 
This research also helps future researchers to un-
derstand the role of management in accounting and 
corporating governance, since prior studies did not 
pay attention to the role of management in account-
ing, auditing and corporating governance (Ham-
brick et al., 2008). 
The rest of thisstudyis organized as follows. 
First, it investigates the effect of  financial and exec-
utive directors’ job rotationon the quality of finan-
cial reporting and then it tries to answer the ques-
tion of ‘how much does punishing directors guilty 
of manipulating income effects?’ Next, it follows on 
examining personality characteristics of directors 
and their effects on information accounting.  It also 
studies the effect of directors`  too much self-con-
fidence on financial reporting such as issuing and 
confirming the expected income and their natural 
Social science section
101 Openly accessible at http://www.european-science.com 
tendency to do fraudulent activities.  Then, it exam-
ines the effect of financial and executive directors`  
sex on the quality of financial reporting through 
empirical research. Final section presents the relat-
ed reasons and conclusion.
Results
According to agent theory, directors are consid-
ered as stockholders`  agents and they are responsi-
ble for maximizing stockholders’ wealth. However, 
maximizing stockholders’ wealth is not the prima-
ry concern of all directors and some related pun-
ishments cannot guarantee it. Risk of terminating 
the contract can be a good incentive for maximizing 
stockholders’ wealth. Job rotation of directors con-
tributes to coordination between the goal of execu-
tive directors and stockholders as well as it increases 
the quality of leadership of directors (Fields, Lys, 
& Vincent, 2001). Majority of studies on the rela-
tionship between corporating performance and job 
rotation of executive directors were conducted by 
Murphy (1999), Hermalin et al. (1998, 2003), and 
Adamz and Hermaline (2010).  Finkeleshtine et al 
(2009) conducted a study on determining job rota-
tion intervals of executive directors and its effects 
on the executive directors`  decisions. The obtained 
results indicate that firms with weak management 
have low quality of income.  In these researches 
things like restatement, not restating or resignation 
of the auditor all suggested low quality of income. 
Generally, after restating the income, replacement 
of executive directors also willincrease (Demerjian 
et al., 2010). This is more consistent with theories of 
human resources management. 
According to this theory, if human resource 
management is effective,the effective personnel re-
places with ineffectiveones. This makesdirectors to 
dissuade from manipulating financial reports. Re-
sults from the study of Arthur de et al (2006) reveal 
that executive directors tend to file financial re-
statements (Arthaud-Day et al., 2006). Although 
these results are consistent with results from De-
cie et al. (2006), theoretical framework used in both 
studies is significantly different (Deshmuk, 2009). 
Results from the study of Arthur de et al show 
that financial restatements not only increase the ac-
curacy of corporating operations but also it reflect 
tendency of the firms to react to the crises resulting 
from removing the executive directors (Arthaud-
Day et al., 2006). Lend (2010) in a research exam-
ines personalities of directors who restate and find 
some evidence that reveals  job rotation of executive 
directors, accuracy of executive directors` restate-
ment within a specific interval increases. The results 
of this study also show that using auditors and de-
pendency of income in restatements serves as an in-
centive to change executive directors (Healy, 1985). 
The study of Leon Miller (2008) indicates that 
inability in identifying deliberate  and unintention-
al mistakes in components of income that are re-
stated, can lead to wrong inferences (Hermalin, & 
Weisbach, 2003). Karapouf et al. (2008) found con-
vincing evidence based on which almost all fraud-
ulent directors lost their jobs. These finding are 
stronger for firms with an independent board of di-
rectors and large number of external stockholders 
(Goel, & Thakor, 2008). Menoun William found 
evidence based on which changing executive di-
rectors increases resignation of independent audi-
tors that in turn can be an excuse for changing ex-
ecutive directors who are not able to solve problems 
of audition reporting (Klein, 1998). Results of the 
study of Fench et al. indicate that almost 60% of di-
rectors are responsible for manipulation of corpo-
rating income and therefore they will face different 
kinds of punishments such as limitation in future 
employment. Results from many studies reveal that 
increases in directors`  job rotation enhances fil-
ing lawsuits about financial reporting. In contrast, 
Agraval et al. (1999) investigated 103 firms and the 
results showed that in firms with fraud, there is evi-
dence ofjob rotation of directors. These results are 
surprising since disclosing fraud reduces the value 
of the firm and it is also a warning about punishing 
the directors. 
Directors`  replacement can restrict disclosure of 
firms about their debts since disclosed cases about 
fraud results in increasingthe legal costs (Agraw-
al & Cooper, 2009).  The research of Agraval et al. 
(2009) provides the following valid reasons about 
impossibility of evaluating the relationship between 
fraud and directors`  replacement. First, it is likely 
that cost of replacing the fraudulent manager is for-
biddenin terms of human resources department’s 
credits. Secondly, firms may try to solve account-
ing problems through improving the level of inter-
nal controls as incurring direct and indirect costs 
to solve accounting problems in firm is forbidden 
and disclosing accounting problems may not lead to 
change in management. Thirdly, restatements may 
result in bad impacts on credit of firm`s capital. In 
these cases, gross profit of directors`  replacement 
may be less. Fourth, governing mechanisms may 
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not be strong enough to lead to quick replacement 
of directors (Agrawal & Cooper, 2009).
Similarly, results of Fondberg Tirol `s study 
showed that presenting excessive profits by firms 
does not have any influences on the executive di-
rectors’ replacement (Beneish, 1999). Based on 
the findings of this study, fraudulent activities do 
not have any significant effects on executive direc-
tors’ replacement. However, results of some stud-
ies show that low quality of profit or being afraid of 
low quality of profit can stimulate board of direc-
tors to change the directors. The quality of income 
index can also answer the question of ‘Do accept-
ed principles of accounting of executive directors 
who manipulate income, consider any punishments 
for them?’ Finally, there is no consensus inideal re-
statement of quality of financial reporting.
Fondeberg and Tiroll argue that description of 
responsibilities based of which they must work is be-
cause of continuing the activities of the firm. Man-
agement can minimize ability of fraud in the firm 
through appropriate monitoring of the activities be-
cause deciding on whether to keep or dismiss peo-
ple greatly depends on their performance in the past 
(Fama, 1980). 
Through using three indices of job security, (i.e. 
competition,product stability, and income stabil-
ity), Ahmed et al. (2011) tried to correct the study 
of Defound and Park. The findings of this research 
support hypothesis in which there is a relationship 
between job security and leveling out the profit.
Discussion
After all, the studies on how quality of finan-
cial reporting effects on the probability of execu-
tive directors’ replacement reveal some complicat-
ed evidence of the effectiveness of human resource 
management.  Furthermore, results of the research-
es indicate that human resource management must 
play an active role in external corporating gover-
nance to prevent opportunism of directors. Future 
research must focus on whether human resource 
management is a supplement  or replacement for in-
ternal governance by considering quality of finan-
cial reporting.
“Success of a teacher is not to suggest mislead 
people that they never lose their success (Bill Gates). 
‘Try not to become a man of success, but rather try 
to become a man of value’ (Albert Einstein). On the 
personality characteristics of directors focusing on 
the question of ‘how do psychologists justify the di-
rectors`  decisions based on their personality charac-
teristics and the effect of these decisions on the out-
put of financial reporting’.
Theoretically, the first theory on personali-
ty characteristics of directors was proposed by He-
birik and Masoun. This theory states that person-
ality characteristics of chief directors influences 
their decisions (Goel, & Thakor, 2008). One of the 
main characteristics of directors is too much self-
confidence.  Therefore reviewing the concept of too 
much self-confidence and its effects on financial 
reporting seems vital. 
After 1960, the term ‘too much self-confidence’ 
has widely attracted attentions. Since 1990`s this 
term has been used in financial and economical 
fields to elaborate abnormal behaviors. According 
to psychology, too much self-confidenceis when-
people think they are more important than others. 
This causes that they thinktoo positively of them-
selves. In other words, too much self-confidence is 
a kind of positive perception error.
Too much self-confidence as a psychological 
characteristic may contributes to discriminative be-
havior (positive) about a certain subject. For exam-
ple, in cash flow it can lead to exaggerating about 
reporting the cash. In addition to controlled per-
ception error, the concept of too much self-confi-
dence includes (Adams, & Ferreira, 2009). Better 
interpretation of the mean (Adamsand et al., 2010) 
unreal optimism, and  controlled perception error. 
Too much self-confidence of the directors may re-
sults in deviation in investment decisions and re-
ducing payable profit. Although too much self-con-
fidence is considered as behavioral deviation, it is 
the most important factor in directors`  promotions 
(Francis et al., 2008).
The concept of too much confidence has re-
cently used in accounting researches. Higherbar 
and Yang (2010) provided evidence that show too 
much confidence of directors makes them to tend 
to overstatement of profit, issuing optimistic pre-
dictions and profit management in order to achieve 
expected profit (Goel, & Thakor, 2008).
Leo (2010) conducted a research on manage-
ment predictions by considering the differences be-
tween too much self-confidence and too low self-
confidence of directors. Other researchers also 
investigated the effect of directors`  predictions with 
too much self-confidence on the market reaction. 
The results showed that wrong predictions have a 
significant effect on the market.
Hillery and Hissary (2011) studied the effect 
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of too much self-confidence on directors’ predic-
tions about profit for four three-month intervals. 
The results revealed that directors`  too much self-
confidencecan reduce accuracy in predicting prof-
it for the next three months. Naturland and Zech-
man provide evidence that indicate directors`   too 
much self-confidence have fraudulent actions. The 
findings confirmed that directors`  too much self-
confidence requires profit management in intervals 
in which directors are not sure about future predic-
tions. Habib et al. (2012) examined the effect of too 
much self-confidence on strategies related to profit 
management and whether the relationship between 
these two changes in the process of global financial 
crisis. The results of this research revealed that di-
rectors with too much self-confidence manage and 
report profit with less accuracy (Gilligan, 1982). 
Other researchers tried to study the effect of fi-
nancial directors`  individual characteristics such as 
risk-taking and too much self-confidence on qual-
ity of financial reporting. The results of their study 
showed limited evidence about the effect of finan-
cial directors`  individual characteristics on their re-
porting choices. Karslo et al. (2011) reexamined the 
relationship between the role of executive directors 
in selecting board of directors`  members and restate-
ments. They provided some evidence for the effect 
of executive directors on selecting board of directors 
which has omitted minimum profits. In contrast, 
results from other researchers work indicate that ex-
ecutive directors must intervene directly in selecting 
board of directors and do not select them by chance. 
They believe that these interventions make the firm 
to develop. 
Recent researches on directors’ too much self-
confidenceintroduced a new chapter in understand-
ing management accounting better.  The present lit-
erature shows a negative viewpoint on too much self 
confidence in management decisions but this litera-
ture must be used cautiously. Role of executive di-
rectors in the process of selecting board of directors 
should be strong.
Goul et al. (2011) believe that selecting women 
as director is appropriate because
 (a) having moral judgment
 (b) maintaining expected value of stockholders.
 According to organizational theories, the re-
sults of performance of female directors in compar-
ison with male directors have better consequences 
for the organization. Presence of women in man-
agement positions can improve the performance of 
the organization and facilitate decision making. It 
also increases quality of financial information and 
as a result causes external stockholders, financial 
analyst, Medias and the public taking positive atti-
tudes towards the firm. 
Beramer et al. (2009) believes that presence of 
women in management positions increases sense of 
interaction in organization. The results show that 
absence of women in management sections can lead 
to financial crisis. For example, Baroness Hug head 
of British financial council believes that sex variety 
in composition of board of directors can mitigate 
the dangers arising from group thinking.
Many studies have been conducted on moral 
differences between two sexes. The results of these 
researches show that there are great differences be-
tween men and women attitudes in business and 
trade behaviors. Men are more interested in eco-
nomic profits and achieving the result at any cost 
even violating the rules, but women tend more to 
interaction, sustainable discipline and consultation 
in relations. 
Adam et al. (2009) believe that elaborating dif-
ferent aspects of the role of sex in financial report-
ing needs more researches. They also believe that 
women tend to be actively present in activities more 
but men tend to monitor the activities. Women have 
higher insights.  Results from other researches show 
that female accountants involve themselves less in 
financial managements. Behavior of men and wom-
en are different in accounting. For example, results 
of Goul et al. (2011) study indicated that presence 
of women increases qualitative level of reported in-
comes (Gervais,.& Odean, 2001). These results also 
show that sex variety improves the performance of 
the firm and raises price of shares (Gervais, & Ode-
an, 2001). Other researches also indicate differences 
between two sexes but limited numbers of research-
es have been conducted investigating on personality 
characteristics of executive directorswhich examine 
the organization issues.
Quality of financial reporting is too much im-
portant in big markets. Therefore, paying attention 
to effective factors in enhancing quality of report-
ing of companies listed in stock market in all coun-
tries is vital. In another study, Goul et al. (2011) 
seeks to answer the question of ‘Does management 
of women in financial issues better than men?’ The 
results showed that there is no great difference be-
tween financial performance of men and women. 
Their study also examined the relationship between 
sex and quality of income in markets in China. 
This section examined the effects and role of sex 
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variety in quality of accounting information. Over 
the past decades using female directors in man-
agement positions has been increased. Sex variety 
in management discussions improves and enhanc-
es quality of financial and accounting information. 
A lot of researches have been conducted researches 
due to raising these discussions. The main purpose 
of conducting such studies is identifying the effects 
of sex variety of directors on financial reporting and 
structure of the capital. The results revealed that sex 
variety provides the development of the firm.
Conclusions 
This research tried to review the studies on the 
relationship between personality of executive and 
financial directors of firms.It focuses on the follow-
ings:
 1-Does proper human resources management 
prevent directors from manipulating financial re-
ports?
2 -Does directors’ too much self-confidence 
influence on financial reporting such as profiting 
statements and presenting unreal predictions in or-
der to justify fraudulent actions? 3-does examining 
executive and financial directors’ gender effect on 
financial reporting?
Findings of this research show the effect of job 
rotation of directors on improving financial report-
ing. These findings are consistent with some stud-
ies and in contradiction to others. This study also 
shows the effect of sex variety on financial report-
ing. In other words, sex variety develops the firm 
and it is effective on maintenance of firm`s activ-
ity. Moreover, it examined the effect of personality 
characteristics of executive and financial directors 
on financial reporting. Findings of this research 
can be a good incentive to conduct future studies.
Finally, it is recommended to consider the findings 
of this research with caution.
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